Mutually assured existence
Public and private banks have reached a modus vivendi
May 13th 2010 | from the print edition
“INDIA is where China was ten years back,” says Mr Kamath, chairman
of ICICI. That is certainly true by size. India’s GDP amounts to about a
quarter of China’s today and its banking industry just a tenth. But in
at least one respect India is well ahead: it has several dynamic
privately owned banks that over the past decade have taken a fifth or so
of the market from the state-controlled banks. Until the financial
crisis in the West the private banks seemed to offer a template for the
entire industry: within a decade or two, it seemed, the state would
retreat significantly. Now India’s mixed model of banking is likely to
persist for longer.
Part of that reflects the fact that India had its own wobble during
2008. This was not a full-blown crisis; indeed, Aditya Puri, chief
executive of HDFC Bank, the second-biggest (and perkiest) private firm,
says to describe it that way would be an “appalling misconception”. But
there was a sharp spike in money-market interest rates after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, a liquidity squeeze and a notable shift in
deposits. At ICICI overall deposits, as well as the stickier category of
savings and current-account deposits, dropped by about a tenth between
June and December 2008. Savers shifted their cash to the
government-controlled banks, which were perceived to be safer. “Money
was pouring out of our ears,” says Mr Bhatt of State Bank of India.
That experience has helped prompt a change of strategy at ICICI,
which for a long time was one of the most admired private banks in the
developing world. After a decade of spectacular growth, fuelled in part
by wholesale funding (including bulk deposits), the bank recently
slammed on the brakes. In 2009 its loan book shrank by 17%.
Chanda Kochhar (one of several female bank bosses in India), who
took over as chief executive from Mr Kamath last year, says that the
bank decided to focus on changing its funding mix towards retail
deposits because as interest rates rise these should be cheaper as well
as stickier than wholesale funds. Current and savings deposits now make
up 42% of total deposits, up from 27% before the crisis. Private banks
so far lack the state banks’ huge branch networks, but they are working
on it. ICICI now has 2,000 branches, against only 755 in early 2007.
That should help it suck in more deposits.
The state banks may hold on for a while yet to the market share they
have taken. Between June 2007 and December 2009, after a long period of
genteel decline, they saw their share of total deposits and loans rise
from 73% to 77%. After years of fierce competition from the private
banks, they have begun to get their act together. At State Bank of
India’s headquarters in Mumbai visitors may still receive a smart salute
from a man in uniform, but, Mr Bhatt says, its technology and products
are now “comparable to the private sector”. Mr Kamath agrees that the
state banks have caught up on technology.
Learning to love state banks
Yet even if the private banks do go back on the attack, attitudes
towards the state-controlled banks have changed for good. After all,
they were the ones that continued to supply credit to the economy during
the downturn. Before the crisis all banks were expanding their loan
books at an annual rate of about 25% (see chart 6). After mid-2008 there
was a big divergence, with the state banks (which come in three main
flavours: the nationalised banks, State Bank of India and the regional
rural banks) keeping credit growing fairly steadily. The private banks
more or less ground to a halt. The foreign banks went from expansion to
sharp decline, with their share of loans dropping from a peak of 7% to a
paltry 5.3% last December.
Most bank executives now also concede that old-fashioned regulation
was shown to have its merits. Indian banks are required to hold a big
slug of their assets (typically just under a third) in government bonds
and at the central bank. Now Western regulators too are considering
pushing up liquidity levels. Indian bankers joke that all the fiddly
rules they face have become the envy of regulators throughout the world.
All this has led to a reappraisal of whether state banks should be
fully privatised in the long term. HDFC Bank’s Mr Puri says that “the
world has changed and the view around here has changed.” Mr Kamath takes
a similar view, predicting that in the new circumstances “India’s
evolution will be more or less in line with China’s.” Mr Bhatt reckons
there will be “no big-bang reform” and that over time the
state-controlled banks’ share will drop only gently, to 55-65% of the
market.
A similar message is heard in Brazil. In the past five years
Brazilian private banks have risen to global significance, helped by a
frenetic 2007 and 2008 when an eighth of the system’s assets changed
hands. Itaú bought Unibanco and Santander bought ABN AMRO’s Brazilian
business.
But just as important has been the expansion of the state banks,
Banco do Brasil (a listed commercial lender with a bias towards
agriculture), Caixa Econômica Federal (a mortgage specialist) and BNDES
(which acts more as an investment company). Together their share of the
financial system’s assets has reversed its earlier decline and now
stands at 42% (see chart 7). Part of their increase in market share
reflects acquisitions, with Banco do Brasil buying Nossa Caixa, a
mid-sized state-owned firm, in 2008 and a 50% stake in Votorantim, a
car-finance specialist, in 2009. But about two-thirds of the rise has
come from lending more than the private firms during the downturn.
That in turn has changed people’s views of a mixed financial system.
Domingos Abreu, chief financial officer of Bradesco, says the state
banks “had a very important role…in the government’s anticyclical
policies”, adding that in a downturn “it makes a difference” to have a
mixture of state, private and foreign banks. He concedes that two years
ago he might have answered the question differently, but now he had to
acknowledge that the state banks have their merits.
Alfredo Sáenz, chief executive of Santander, which owns the country’s
third-biggest private lender, quips that Brazil keeps an “artistic
equilibrium” between the private and the public sectors. Persio Arida, a
former governor of the central bank and president of BNDES, and now a
partner at BTG Pactual, Brazil’s leading independent investment bank,
says that the “consensus” in the country is that the state banks played a
vital role. However, he cautions that until the extent of bad debts
created by their lending is known, no definitive judgment can be
reached.
Russia holds the line
In Russia up to 54% of the system’s assets are state-controlled,
according to Andrei Vernikov, an economist, compared with 45% in 2007.
Foreign banks’ share stands at 18%. The balance-sheets of the three
European banks that are most active in Russia, UniCredit, Raiffeisen
International and Société Générale, together shrank by about a quarter
in euro terms in 2009. Royal Bank of Scotland’s loans to Russian
corporate customers dropped by 45% in sterling terms. Net loans at
state-controlled Sberbank and VTB declined by only 4% and 10%
respectively in local-currency terms. Last summer the government took a
larger stake in VTB to bring its holding up to 86%. Andrew Keeley, an
analyst at Troika Dialog, an investment bank, says that although the
government is likely to sell the additional stake in VTB again, it
intends to keep majority control of both big banks.
But none of this means that a Soviet-style banking system is about to
emerge in any of these countries. In China the government did take
control of credit during the crisis, but for other state banks it was
more of a nudge and a wink. Mr Bhatt says he was left to his own
devices. Most governments also want private-sector banks to raise the
level of competition. Even in China the state accepts some innovative
upstarts, such as China Merchants Bank, a mid-sized bank with diffuse
ownership and no direct state control. And all emerging markets want
some foreign banks in order to keep local firms on their toes.
So although the ratio of ingredients varies, the objective mostly
seems to be a mix with a strong state presence. This is seen as more
responsive to businesses, less vulnerable to flaky foreigners and more
open to “soft” control by the state as it tries to manage the economic
cycle. Western bankers see its merits too: HSBC’s Mr Geoghegan, a
veteran of banking in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia, reckons
that a healthy combination of foreign and local firms leaves foreign
banks politically less exposed.
The problem for state banks is that they need to find a way of
raising capital without diluting the government’s holding. Most
state-controlled banks are listed because a quotation brings market
discipline to managers and provides useful information about the
performance of the bank. But governments seem determined to hold on to a
stake of at least 51%. For example, Banco do Brasil, now the country’s
largest lender by assets, announced plans to raise $5 billion earlier
this year, but its objective remains the “maintenance of the
government’s shareholding control”. Turkey is thinking about floating
its largest lender, Ziraat Bank, but the state seems likely to retain
control. It is the same story in China, says Bill Stacey, an analyst at
Aviate Global, a brokerage firm. The government is happy to sell shares
in banks but wants to keep a majority stake. Likewise, in Russia the
state wants to retain control of the two biggest banks.
What happens when the state’s holding gets close to that crucial 50%?
State Bank of India expects to receive a capital injection from the
government this year. Its chairman, Mr Bhatt, says it is still an open
question whether the state might breach the 50% threshold in the medium
term, but even then it would seek to have a big enough stake to remain
the dominant shareholder. Many governments are in better fiscal
condition than India’s and have more scope to top up banks’ capital.
Emerging-market banks’ hunger for capital used to ensure that they
would ultimately be sold off to the market—or to foreigners. Not any
more. So the prospect now is of a fast-growing, innovative banking
industry that remains subject to conservative regulation and only
gradual shifts in control. After the West’s experience with
no-holds-barred banking, that may be a good idea. But for growth-starved
Western banks desperate to do business in emerging markets it means
they will find it even harder to get in.
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